$\mathbf{1}^{1}$

"Winning [C Block] bidders fashioned bids in accordance with the best information available at the time. Subsequent unforeseen and unforeseeable events, however, conspired to diminish the value of the licenses and close the financing window for start-up PCS ventures. The major event was collapse in market value for radio licenses."

Larry Darby, Darby Associates, 7/21/97 (emphasis added)

"NEW YORK, June 20 (Reuter) - Chase Telecommunications Inc's \$160 million junk bond deal was indefinitely postponed late on Thursday as investors continued to turn a cold shoulder to startup telecom companies, according to a source close to the deal."

- Reuters, June 20, 1997 (emphasis added).

"To the extent that the C Block delays continue, it is a boon to incumbent operators, as the competitive landscape will not become as heated as quickly as anticipated."

- Jeffrey L. Hines, NatWest Securities, 6/30/97

Myth #6: The C Block bidders were reckless and deserve no Commission consideration

1 +

- ◆ CBO report found that C Block prices were reasonable.
- ◆ CBO report also states that A and B Block prices were lower than C Block prices because of a relative lack of competition in that auction. A and B Block auction bidders received bargain prices (See Appendix 3).
- ◆ The eligibility ratio in the A and B Block auction was 1.9; the eligibility ratio for the C Block was 6.7.

Myth #7: A change in the rules at this date would be unfair to other bidders

 $\mathbf{1}^{-1}$

- ◆ Pre-auction FCC rule permits restructuring of payment obligations (Section 1.2110(e)(4)(ii)).
- ◆ Parties whose models valued spectrum the highest would have won regardless of what rules were in effect at the time of the auction.
- ◆ Many bidders left the auction with standing high bids that would not be financeable in today's market, e.g., GO Communications \$58.24 net per POP bid for Miami, North Coast Mobile \$52.45 net per POP bid for New York, and U.S. AirWaves \$38.46 net per POP bid for Dallas.
- ◆ C Block auction winners made down payment of \$1.02 billion.

Myth #8: C-block licensees reap disproportionate benefits in a restructuring

- ◆ Statutory limitation on ability to dilute control group interests (Sec. 24.709).
- NextWave on record in support of rule changes that would permit dilution of control group interests so long as control group has *de facto* control.
 - Reply Comments of NextWave Telecom Inc., In re Broadband PCS C and F Block Installment Payment Restructuring, WT Docket No. 97-82 (July 7, 1997).
 - Comments of NextWave Telecom Inc., In re Broadband PCS C and F Block Installment Payment Restructuring, WT Docket No. 97-82 (July 23, 1997).
 - Reply Comments of NextWave Telecom, In the Matter of Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules -- Competitive Bidding Proceeding, WT Docket No. 97-82 (April 16, 1997).

Myth #9: Revision of bankruptcy laws is necessary to protect the integrity of the auctions.

- ◆ Change in bankruptcy laws would further complicate financing opportunities at a time when financing for new entities already is scarce.
- ◆ It is ironic that many parties who argue that rules should not be changed also argue for changes in the bankruptcy laws themselves.

Myth #10: Restructure would compromise the integrity of the auction process

11

- ◆ The Commission has performed incredibly well in conducting auctions, but the enormity of the process assures that all the consequences of the work done to date were not foreseen and adjustments should be made as circumstances warrant.
- ◆ Specifically, the full consequences of the FCC's three roles as regulator, auction house and banker (in the installment payment context) were not fully understood.

"Winning [C Block] bidders fashioned bids in accordance with the best information available at the time. Subsequent unforeseen and unforeseeable events, however, conspired to diminish the value of the licenses and close the financing window for start-up PCS ventures. The major event was collapse in market value for radio licenses."

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"Omnipoint should also benefit if the terms [of the Government financing] are not changed because some of its competition would come even later, if ever, to the market."

Richard Prentiss, Raymond James and Associates,
 7/8/97

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"The continued delays in C Block financing are a positive for both cellular and PCS: (1) it delays a new entrant and (2) any reduction/easing of terms will create a less desperate competitor and therefore maintain a more rational market. This particularly extends the lead enjoyed by existing PCS players such as Omnipoint, Western Wireless, and Aerial."

- Thomas J. Lee, Smith Barney, 7/11/97

Conclusion

- ◆ There is a win/win solution for competition and taxpayers.
- Rescheduling keeps government whole.
 - Ability to ensure taxpayer and competition
- ♦ Limitations of a Reauction

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Appendix 1: License Concentration

License Concentration of Cellular/PCS Licensees by POPs

Total Wireline POPs

Company	Type of Carrier	Total PCS POPs	Cellular POPs	Total POPs	Percent of Total	Cumulative Total	Wireline POPs	Percent of Total	Cumulative Total
AT&T	Wireline	258,539,720	104,790,396	363,330,116	19.96%	19.96%	363,330,116	19.96%	19.96%
Sprint .	Mireline 🐨	279,542,834	P4 188	779,542,834	15.36%	35.32%	279,542,834	15.36%	35.32%
PCS PrimeCo	Wireline	61,812,211	149,979,864	211,792,075	11.64%	46.96%	211,792,075	11.64%	46.96%
NextWave	Non-Wireline	163,011,126	-	163,011,126	8.96%	55.92%	-	0.00%	46.96%
Omnipoint	Non-Wireline	131,044,147	-	131,044,147	7.20%	63.12%	-	0.00%	46.96%
Western Wireless	Non-Wireline	80,073,531	6,511,543	86,585,074	4.76%	67.87%	-	0.00%	46.96%
BellSouth A 444	Wireline	26,029,599	54,986,809	81,016,408	4.45%	72.33%	81,016,408	4.45%	51.41%
GTE . W	Wireline	2,091,774	77,435,326	79,527,100	4.37%	76.69%	79,527,100	4.37%	55.78%
Southwestern Bell	Wireline 1	9,185,124	55,397,316	64,582,440	3.55%	80.24%	64,582,440	3.55%	59.33%
ALLTEL! # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #	Wireline 🚶	31,480,277	25,089,303	56,569,580	3.11%	83.35%	56,569,580	3.11%	62.44%
TDS/Aerial	:: Wireline 📇 🗒	25,847,991	25,279,238	51,127,229	2.81%	86.16%	51,127,229	2.81%	65.25%
Ameritech	Wireline	8,181,622	31,717,797	39,899,419	2.19%	88,35%	39,899,419	2.19%	67.44%
Pocket	Non-Wireline	35,114,380	-	35,114,380	1.93%	90.28%	-	0.00%	67.44%
PacTel	Wireline	33,854,632		33,854,632	1.86%	92.14%	33,854,632	1.86%	69.30%
Intercel	Non-Wireline	32,081,732	a avere i citta rinik olikok bik brako	32,081,732	1.76%	93.91%		0.00%	69.30%
U S West	Wireline : "	22,182,428		22,182,428	1.22%	95.12%	22,182,428	1.22%	70.52%

The top 3 wireline companies own nearly half of the available POPs in the U.S.

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And, more than 70% of the available POPs in the U.S. are controlled by 11 wireline companies.

Source: FCC data and Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Report, The Wireless Communications Industry (Spring 1997).

License Concentration of Cellular/PCS Licensees by Markets

			Cellular Carriers	
		1996		
Rank	Market Name	POPs	A	В
Nalik	New York, NY	18,400,203	A TAT	BANM
ź	Los Angeles, CA	15.679.293	LA Cellular	AirTouch
3	Chicago, IL	8.467.720	SBM	AMERITECH
4	San Francisco, CA	6.842.466	T&TA	GTE
5	Philadelphia, PA	5,984,423	Comcast	BANM
6	Dallas, TX	4,828,566	AT&T	SBM
7	Detroit, MI	4,785,173	AirTouch	AMERITECH
8	Houston, TX	4,598,155	AT&T/BELLSOUTH	GTE
9	Washington, DC	4,410,587	SBM	BANM
10	Boston, MA	4,177,962	SBM	BANM
11	Atlanta, GA	3,763,994	AirTouch	BELLSOUTH
12	Miami, FL	3,577,306	T&TA	BELLSOUTH
13	Minneapolis, MN	3,063,561	AT&T	AirTouch
14	Seattle, WA	3,055,225	TATA	AirTouch
15	Cleveland, OH	2,940,521	AirTouch	GTE
16	St Louis, MO	2,807,363	AMERITECH	SBM
17	Phoenix, AZ	2.720,380	BANM	AirTouch
18	San Diego, CA	2,679,864	GTE	AirTouch
19	Baltimore, MD	2,552,338	SBM	BANM
20	Pittsburgh, PA	2,517,972	AT&T	BANM
21	Tampa, FL	2,394,524	AT&T	GTE
22	Denver, CO	2,386,290	AT&T	AirTouch
23	Cincinnati, OH	2,091,774	AirTouch	AMERITECH
24	Portland, OR	1,945,500	AT&T	AirTouch
25	Kansas City, MO	1,930,633	AT&T/AirTouch	SBM
26	Charlotte, NC	1,861,677	BANM	ALLTEL
27	Sacramento, CA	1,832,812	AT&T	AirTouch
28	Milwaukee, WI	1,799,556	BELLSOUTH	AMERITECH
29	Norfolk, VA	1,785,196	360 Comm.	GTE
30	San Antonio, TX	1,728,049	AT&T	SBM
31	Nashville, TN	1,591,314	GTE	BELLSOUTH
32	Columbus, OH	1,574,030	AirTouch	AMERITECH
33	Providence, RI	1,505,903	SNET	BANM
34	Salt Lake City, UT	1,497,885	TATA	AirTouch
35	Memphis, TN	1,471,561	GTE	BELLSOUTH
36	Orlando, FL	1,447,059	AT&T	BELLSOUTH
37	Louisville, KY	1,428,320	GTE	BELLSOUTH
38	Indianapolis, IN	1,420,258	BELLSOUTH	GTE
39	New Orleans, LA	1,396,435	Radiofone	BELLSOUTH
40	Oklahoma City, OK	1,368,004	AT&T	SBM
41	Greensboro, NC	1,330,742	GTE	360 Comm.
42	Birmingham, AL	1,270,221	GTE	BELLSOUTH
43	Raleigh, NC	1,261,166	GTE	360 Comm.
44	Buffalo, NY	1,234,670	SBM	BANM
45	Dayton, OH	1,218,672	AMERITECH	AirTouch
46	Jacksonville, FL	1,208,139	T&TA	BELLSOUTH
47	Richmond, VA	1,191,504	BELLSOUTH	GTE
48	Rochester, NY	1,153,214	SBM	BANM
49	Hartford, CT	1,121,164	BANM	SNET
50	Albany, NY	1,057,180	SBM	BANM

	_	PCS Carrie	rs		-
A	В	с	D	E	<u>F</u>
OMPT	SPRINT	NextWave	TAMO	AT&T	Northcoast
SPRINT	PACTEL	NextWave	AT&T	Gabelli	Gabelli
AT&T	PRIMECO	Pocket	SPRINT	SPRINT	NextWave
SPRINT	PACTEL	GWI	AT&T	Western	NextWave
AT&T	SPRINT	OMPT	Comcast	Gabelli	NextWave
	SPRINT	Pocket	AT&T	AT&T	NextWave
PRIMECO	SPRINT	Pocket	NextWave	OMPT	OMPT
AT&T	PRIMECO	NextWave	SPRINT	AT&T	Telecorp
AERIAL	AT&T	NextWave	Gabelli	OMPT	Gabelli
SPRINT	SPRINT	NextWave	OMPT	OMPT	Northcoast
AT&T	intercel	GM	SPRINT	ALLTEL	NextWave
AT&T		GM	AT&T	OMPT	OMPT
SPRINT	PRIMECO	NextWave	U S WEST	AT&T	Northcoast
SPRINT	AERIAL		AT&T	Western	Western
Western	SPRINT	NextWave	SPRINT	Western	Northcoast
AMERITECH	AT&T	NextWave	OMPT	Western	NextWave
AT&T	SPRINT	Pocket	U S WEST	Western	Western
AT&T	SPRINT	REAUCTION	AT&T	Gabelli	Central OR
SPRINT	PACTEL	NextWave	Gabelli	Gabelli	OMPT
SPRINT	AT&T	NextWave		Radiofone	Devon
SPRINT	AERIAL	NextWave	AT&T	BELLSOUTH	Telecorp
AERIAL	PRIMECO	NextWave	SPRINT	USWEST	Radiofone
SPRINT	Western	NextWave	AT&T		Westem
AT&T	GTE	NextWave	SPRINT	CINCINNATI BELL	Magnacom
Western	SPRINT	NextWave	AT&T	U S WEST	DCC
SPRINT	AERIAL	NextWave	ALLTEL	AT&T	AirGate
T&TA	BELLSOUTH	NextWave	SPRINT	ALLTEL	NextWave
SPRINT	PACTEL	GWI	AT&T	WEST COAST	
SPRINT	PRIMECO	Indus, Inc.	AT&T	Western	NextWave
AT&T	PRIMECO	NextWave	SPRINT	Western	OMPT
SPRINT	PRIMECO	NextWave	Western	AT&T	OMPT
SPRINT	AT&T	Chase	Intercel	Intercel	OMPT
AT&T	intercel	NextWave	SPRINT	SPRINT	Northcoast
AT&T	SPRINT	NextWave	ACC	Northcoast	OMPT
Western	SPRINT	PCS 2000	T&TA	U S WEST	NextWave
Intercel	SBM	Chase	SPRINT	ALLTEL	Telecorp
AERIAL	PRIMECO	NextWave	SPRINT	AT&T	Telecorp
AT&T	SPRINT	NextWave	Intercel	Intercel	Mercury PCS
SPRINT	AMERITECH	NextWave	TATA	OMPT	21st Century
SPRINT	PRIMECO	Pocket	T&TA	AT&T	Telecorp
Western	SPRINT	NextWave	Triad	AT&T	DCC
AT&T	BELLSOUTH	NextWave	SPRINT	ALLTEL	AirGate
SPRINT	intercel	Mercury PCS	ALLTEL	T&TA	OMPT
AT&T	BELLSOUTH	Urban	SPRINT	ALLTEL	ComScape
SPRINT	AT&T	OMPT	Gabelli	REAUCTION	Devon
AT&T	GTE	NextWave	SPRINT	Western	Devco
Intercel	PRIMECO	NextWave	SPRINT	ALLTEL	Southern Wireless, L.P.
AT&T	PRIMECO	NextWave	SPRINT	Western	Urban
SPRINT	AT&T	OMPT	OMPT	TATA	Northcoast
OMPT	SPRINT	Gabelli	T&TA	AT&T	Northcoast
OMPT	SPRINT	NextWave	AT&T	ACC	Vtei

Wireline companies own 79% of the cellular licenses and 87% of the A-and B-block PCS licenses in the top 50 markets In total, wireline companies own 57 percent of the cellular/PCS licenses in the top 50 markets

Source: FCC data and Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Report, The Wireless Communications Industry (Spring 1997).

Appendix 2: Analyst Reports

SMITH BARNEY INC.

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Comments (754 B0 article 82 FCE changes to C-block payments; pot a surprise

07/11/97 Mobile Communication Systems (U.S. CHILX) THOMAS J. H

for the C-block PCS licenses from quarterly to annual interest payments

* The change in our opinion is not a surprise given the PCC previously

"indefinitely" delayed quarterly payments on the debts

* This does little to address the critical challenge facing C-block

holders - their high prices paid makes financing mearly impossible

Met-net: the continued delays in C-block financing are a positive for both

cellular and PCS: (1) it delays a new entrant and (2) any reduction/essing

of terms will create a less desperate competitor and therefore maintain a

more rational market. This particularly extends the lead entoyed by

existing PCS players such as Omnipoint (OMPT-25, target \$31),

Western Wireless (WMCD-25, target \$29) and Aarial (AKMI-35, target \$14)

07/11/97 Mobile Communication Systems (U.S. ONLY) THOMAS OPINION:-Ę 128

According to an article in the Wall Street Journal today, the FCC is expected to ammounce changes in interest installment payments for the C-block PCS (personal communications service) licensees from quarterly annual interest payments. from quarterly đ

** The change in our opinion is not a surprise given the PCC previously "indefinitely" delayed quarterly payments on the debts.

** A potential change to annual installments does little to address the critical challenge facing many C-block license holders — their dispreportionstely high prices paid (compared to previous austica winners) makes obtaining financing meanly impossible, and therefore delays their entrance into the wireless marketplace.

** We believe any resolution to the debt outstanding will involve protected negotiations and probably ultimately result in one of two scenarios: (1) a revocation and resuction of the spectrum of defaulted C-block license expers or (2) an effective reduction of the present value of the debt execution in principle value extension/modification of payment terms.

Netwhet: We reitherate that the continued delays in C-block financing are a positive for existing wireless carriers, both cellular and PCS, for two reasons: (1) it delays a new entrant in the marketplace and (2) any reduction/easing of financing terms will create a less desperate competitor and therefore more likely maintain a rational marketplace. In any case, it appears that the wireless marketplace in the mark few years will be a less crowded space (a players total) than originally envisioned these assets ago. We would note the following three observations: **epetitor**

(PCS, or personal communications services) players such as Omnipoint (OWFT-rated 2S, target \$31), Hestern Wireless (MWCA-rated 2S, target \$29) and herial Communications (AWMI-rated 3S, target \$14) and would be buyers of their stock. This extends the time to market lead exjoyed by existing new entrants

2. Delays in the C-block also benefit the cellular incumbents including 360 Communications (AD-rated 2M, target \$30), Airbouch (ATI-rated 3M, target \$28), Vanguard Cellular (VCKIA-rated 3H, target \$16) as their existing market share will be subject to less intense competition (one loss competitor). Still, we believe urban cellular carriers are subject to the "cellular straight—jacket" and therefore remain cantions on Airbouch (see

WIRELESS WAVES

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A workly update of NATWEST's global Wireless Services & Wireless Equapment stocks Jeffrey L. Hines (212) 602-5741

NATWEST SECURITIES

Notanne 3, Issue 26

biocom comes rearing tack led by CLECs (+32.9%), Cable (+23.7%), & Essie, (+19.8%) Asser Secap: With one trading day left, 2097 Ishows strong market (S&P500 + 14.7%) as

Error designation of the	Additional Transportation on the Parket States	30-year T-bood week	Winding (14)	Colleter (17)	PCSOM (11)	Sap Gas	Espirante (21)	CHECK	Paris (9)	CIBC CORPORATION	Discussion of Marie
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regarding the C-Block PCS l'occases, since they still have sizable delats owed so the federal gov't. It should also be no suprise tiza including lengthening the firsteing/payment schedules, reducing the interest rates, or take permiss on the doller for what they originally bid. We find it disquisting that the same hiddens who bid perimps "credible" bidders to drop out, are now asking the FCC to he C-Block winners in question offered up several suggestions. and/or amends the payment structure, or 2) the PCC demands payments under the "original" sents. In either case, it appears any significant C-Block competition is at least a year off. If the PCC tie the licenses up in Chapter 11 court, after which they will have to be menorisated (both could take considerable time). We note that the PCC has already "bend" on its roles, by delaying payments. Notes & Notes: It Readly is A Windows World continue, it is a boom to magnificant container, as the commontive indicator will not become as brined as <u>ouncity</u> as item non-reserved.

Two basic accuration seem likely: 1) the PCC accepts less money up prices during the auxion, and forced more "rational" and the RCC plays immibali (somerio 2), defaulting C-Blockers conid amends the finance structure (scenario I), bidders that tropped/were forced out will likely us up the licenses i parions were due this week on what the FCC should do ming the C-Block PCS licenses, suce they still have st ed their payment. To the extent that the C-block delays IN 111 COURT, H

annes, 10 MHz of consignous spectrum quickly - allowing Nexael to bid for so called "lower" 800 channels, a new development. The FCC issued a "proposal" to amended onles for the 800 MHz
 SMR assertion - which should allow NEXTEX. (NXTL-\$18 %-B) to · NORTA (NORA-575%A). EXECUSOR (ERUCY-540%-H), and -MOTORGI.A (MOT-S76 7/8-H) amounced criters for security KCSO million of wireless infrastructure, including \$650M for a GSM section and a SOOM for a TACS copanion both in China, and a \$132M order for an AMPS expan MOTOROLA, along with UnWard Planet, amounced plans to be develop an open protocol for warders dute, e.g. the way callula On the Person


> could hassen the development of larger scale wireless data service of LENATER (GEMS-S16 1/8-A) amounteed what could be the quotes, o-mail, fax, lineanet, info-services, etc. first of several paging infrastructure orders from CELPACE of Puerto Rico and its associates throughout Latin America. The An open protocol MS AL

order for an alphanaments system is expandiable to regional /
nationwide and appario-able so RaFE EX for two-way.

• HELL CANADA (BCE-\$28 3/16-NF) is considering fixed
wireless as part of its \$200M local network upgrade.

• WINSTAR (WCII-\$13-NF) commenced commencial operation
of its wireless local loop at 38 GHz in its 5th city, San Diogr.
Winstar also received 4 new licenses from the FCC, giving it a footprint in 47 of the too 50 mics in the US.

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TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

July 8, 1997 - Initiation of Coverage

RICHARD PRENTISS (813) 573-3800 x2567 Tom Staszak RESEARCH ASSOCIATE

QUITYPESEARCE


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OMNIPOINT CORPORATION ----

(OTC-OMPT) - RATING: BUY (1)

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"Based on detailed discoursed cash flow analysis.	NM: Not Meaningful

EPS (FY=Dec)	1996A(a)	1997E	1998E
Q1 (Mar)	\$(0.39)	\$(1.02)A	\$(1.82)
Q2 (Jun)	(0.47)	(1.35)	(1,95)
Q3 (Sep)	(0.55)	(1.64)	(1.95)
Q4 (Dec)	(1.21)	(2.49)	(2.72)
Full Year	\$(2.71)	\$(8.51)	\$(8,44)
Revenues (mil)	\$0.5	\$68.7	\$243.5
EBITDA (mii)	\$(84.8)	\$(184.6)	\$(149.5)



(a) Full-year EPS based on average shares for the full year.

Graph © Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 1997.

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
- WE ARE INITIATING COVERAGE OF OMNIPOINT WITH A BUY (1) RATING AS ITS INTERNATIONALLY ACCLAIMED SENIOR MANAGEMENT TEAM IMPROVES COVERAGE IN NEW YORK AND PREPARES TO LAUNCH SERVICE IN PHILADELPHIA.
- AS A PIONEER'S PREFERENCE WINNER AND SMALL BUSINESS, OMPT ACQUIRED ITS LICENSES AT A DISCOUNT OR WITH VERY FAVORABLE GOVERNMENT FINANCING. ITS LARGE. LUCRATIVE WARKETS HAVE HIGH POPULATION DENSITIES AND INCLUDE INTERNATIONAL CITIES THAT MAKE OMNIPOINT AN IDEAL PARTICIPANT IN THE CONTINUED CONSOLIDATION OF THE GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY.
- THE FCC IS ACTIVELY CONSIDERING IMPROVING THE TERMS OF THE GOVERNMENT FINANCING. WE BELIEVE THAT REGARDLESS OF ITS FINAL DECISION, OUR MID-YEAR 1998 TARGET PRICE OF \$27 COULD IMPROVE BECAUSE OF BETTER FINANCING TERMS OR SLOWER TO MATERIALIZE COMPETITION.
- COMBINING THIS WITH THE POTENTIAL OF ITS TECHNOLOGY BUSINESS, "BASEBALL TRADING CARD" LICENSES AND CURRENT 71% UPSIDE TO OUR TARGET PRICE PROVIDES WHAT WE BELIEVE IS A COMPELLING REASON TO INVEST IN OMNIPOINT.

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The Raymond James Financial Center







A CBO



per-megahertz price paid for the Chicago licenses was \$1.05—notably higher than the prices paid for the single competitively auctioned licenses in the New York and Los Angeles markets (\$0.56 and \$0.86, respectively). Prices could be expected to vary between markets on the basis of consumer demographics—income and time spent commuting in automobiles, for example—but differences as large as those evident in the A&B block auction are too great to be explained by such factors.

Additional questions about the efficiency of the distribution of licenses in the A&B block auction and the two other broadband sales that followed it are raised when the average prices for licenses are compared. The average per-person, per-megahertz price in the A&B block was about \$0.50. The C block auction registered a substantially higher price of about \$1.35, which drops to about \$0.80 after adjusting for the terms of the installment payments available to the small businesses that won C block licenses (see Box 1, which discusses the differences in prices paid for licenses in the A&B and C block auctions). In contrast, the average price in the D.E&F auction was about \$0.35, lower than that reported in either of the broadband PCS auctions that preceded it. Prices could be expected to vary among the auctions because the licenses sold granted the right to use different-sized blocks of spectrum that allowed the licensee to operate in different-sized geographic areas. Nevertheless, the ranking of average prices from high to low corresponds to the potential competition in each of the auctions as measured by the eligibility ratio. That ratio was 6.7 for the C block sale, compared with 1.9 for the A&B block sale and 1.7 for the D.E&F sale.

Why wasn't the A&B block auction more competitive? Fewer bidders entered that auction because the FCC restricted participation by the current holders of cellular licenses and permitted would-be competitors to join forces before the auction began. Both decisions should be evaluated as trade-offs between ensuring competition in wireless telecommunications markets and ensuring competition in the auctions for licenses to participate in those markets. Specifically, the commission chose to sacrifice the opportunity to maximize auction receipts to ensure an adequate number of technically capable and financially sound service providers and, ultimately, to sustain the competitive pricing and services that such providers would bring to telecommunications markets.

Table 2.
Total Population in Markets for Personal
Communications and Cellular Telephone Service
Covered by the Three Largest Winners in the A&
Block Auction (In millions of people)

	Personal Communi- cations Services	Cellular Telephone Services	Tota
AT&T	107.0	68.3°	175
WirelessCo	144.9	28.4°	173
PCS PrimeCo	57.2	110.4°	167

SOURCE. Congressional Budget Office based on Peter Cramto "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessmer (draft, University of Maryland, July 15, 1996), Table and Cellular Telephone Industry Association, The Wir less Marketbook (Spring 1996).

- a. Estimated as the difference between the total mobile telephor population as reported by the Cellular Telephone industry Assoc ation and the total population in the personal communication services markets as reported by Cramton.
- Represents the cellular telephone markets of WirelessCo pa: ners Comcast (7.6 million people) and Cox Communication (20.8 million people).
- c. Represents the cellular telephone markets of Bell Atlantic/NYNE (57.7 million people) and AirTouch (55.2 million people) adjusts downward by 2.5 million people for overlapping licenses in A zona markets.

The result of the A&B block auction that mostrongly suggests an efficient distribution of license was the success of bidders in aggregating groups clicenses. Each of the three largest winning bidders-AT&T, WirelessCo, and PCS PrimeCo—won license that enable them to offer nationwide service.²⁴ The PCS licenses won by AT&T and PCS PrimeCo, whe combined with the cellular telephone licenses that each bidder already owned, provide nearly complete national coverage. WirelessCo, the largest winner in the auction, had the smallest cellular coverage but won 29 PC

^{24.} WirelessCo is a combination of the long-distance telephone compa: Sprint and three large cable television companies (TCI, Comcast, a: Cox Communications). After the A&B block auction, Wirelesst changed its name to SprintCom. PCS PrimeCo is a combination three regional Bell operating companies (NYNEX, Bell Atlantic, a: USWest) plus AirTouch (a spin-off of another former Bell compar PacTel), which provides cellular telephone service in PacTel's opering area.